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Holding schools publicly accountable for the per-
formance of their students in public examinations and 
for their key stage test scores is argued to be fair and 
give an incentive to schools to improve their “standards”. 
When ﬁ rst introduced, simple school averages—“raw 
scores”—formed the basis for rankings. In these, per-
haps not surprisingly, schools that recruited from the 
brightest and most advantaged pupils tended to emerge 
at the top of the rankings. In 1995 the government ac-
cepted the research evidence and agreed to move to a 
“value-added” system. Th is takes account of the diﬀ er-
ing intake achievements of students entering the school. 
Explicit or implicit selection procedures, for example, 
would aﬀ ect the value-added score. More recently so 
called “contextual value-added” systems have been used 
which, in addition to adjusting for individual student 
prior achievements, also attempt to adjust for such 
factors as the average prior achievement of a student’s 
peers. Eligibility for free school meals and lack of spoken 
English at home come into play here. Th us, an inner-
city school with a so-called “sink estate” catchment area 
would receive more contextual value-added points. 
Th e current rankings produced by this last sys-
tem are used by the oﬃ  cial school inspection system 
( OFSTED) to inform their judgements, and also, in 
some places, as part of a local or internal accountability 
screening system to identify those “outlying” institutions 
that may require special attention2. Th e interesting as-
pect of such “internal accountability” systems is that they 
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Since rankings of schools’ examination results were ﬁ rst 
published in Britain in the early 1990s they have become 
an established feature of the educational landscape. 
Since then they have been joined by key stage test score 
rankings at the end of primary school. Although limited 
now to England, they have become more sophisticated, 
most notably by acquiring so called “value-added” ele-
ments. When the results for schools are released by the 
government each autumn they are widely published as 
rankings in the national and local newspapers and are 
used by schools in their promotional literature. Th ose 
institutions seen to be high or low in the rankings are of-
ten singled out for praise or condemnation; the implicit 
assumption is that the position in the rankings can be 
treated as a measure of the quality of their educational 
provision. How justiﬁ ed is that assumption? How are 
these rankings or “league tables” promoted? And how 
useful are they in practice, both to an authority seeking 
out strong or weak schools and to a parent seeking the 
best school for their child? We shall not be overly tech-
nical but advise any reader interested in the technical 
detail to consult Goldstein and Spiegelhalter1.
Accountability and choice
Th ere are two principal justiﬁ cations for league tables, 
one based on notions of institutional accountability 
and the other on their use for making choices between 
schools. 
School league tables are eagerly scanned by parents hoping to find the best school for 
their child, and by teachers hoping to see their school rise in the rankings. But do they 
tell parents what they need to know? Harvey Goldstein and George Leckie argue 
that league tables are not fit for that purpose, and say it is time that their publication 
should cease.
Do league tables 
give any guide to 
how well a school 
is performing?
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treat the rankings as just one source of evidence 
about potential problems to be further inves-
tigated rather than as deﬁ nitive statements 
about the quality of education within the insti-
tutions. Clearly, then, education oﬃ  cials do not 
regard rankings on their own as strong enough 
evidence for a judgement.
Th is is reinforced by recognising that 
each school-eﬀ ect estimate should have an un-
certainty (conﬁ dence) interval attached so that 
a statistically well informed judgement can be 
made about any diﬀ erences between schools 
or diﬀ erences between any one school and the 
population average. Th us, the Department for 
Schools, Children and Families (DCSF) web-
site (http://www.standards.dfes.
gov.uk/) now provides intervals for value-
added estimates, although these are generally 
not prominent in media presentations or dis-
cussions. 
In its booklet of guidance for parents 
choosing schools the DCSF states: “Th e 
Government publishes these [league tables] 
every year. Th ey tell you how well pupils did in 
 exams at every school—and you can compare 
one school’s results to others in your area and 
nationally” (http://www.dfes.gov.
uk/sacode/). For parents, access to these 
data is typically through the tables published 
in the media. Yet, when making a choice of 
school the same issues occur as when the tables 
are used for accountability purposes. Th ere are, 
however, two important diﬀ erences. 
From the point of view of school choice it 
seems clear that we should not adjust for any 
school level factors—those taken account of 
in the contextual value-added rankings. Th e 
relevant question for a parent is whether, given 
the characteristics of their child, any particular 
school can be expected to produce better sub-
sequent achievements than any other chosen 
school or schools. If a school level factor is as-
sociated with achievement this is strictly part 
of the eﬀ ect being measured and therefore not 
something to be adjusted for. Th us, the DCSF 
contextual value-added estimates are not ap-
propriate for choice purposes. Th ey do indeed 
give diﬀ erent rankings from the raw scores, 
with a correlation of just 0.76 between the two 
sets of ranks. In terms of school choice there 
is a further key issue, which is entirely ignored 
in the tables currently produced. To illustrate, 
consider the case of secondary schools and 
results of GCSE examinations taken by pupils 
at age 16. For a cohort of 11-year-olds entering 
schools in 2008, the relevant GCSE exam re-
sults will be for the year 2013. In other words 
for the purpose of choice, what is required are 
predicted school-eﬀ ects some 6 years beyond 
those typically currently available. Given 
that the correlation between school-eﬀ ects 
for cohorts of children taking such exams 6 
years apart is only about 0.6, this considerably 
reduces the precision of any comparisons. In 
other words, exam performance now is a poor 
guide to performance in 6 years time. In the 
next section we shall illustrate this with recent 
data.
Finally, for both accountability and choice 
purposes it has long been recognised that 
“diﬀ erential” eﬀ ects exist. Th us, for example, 
the diﬀ erences between schools are known to 
depend on the prior achievement value so that 
rankings will change depending on this prior 
achievement chosen for comparison. Again, 
this is ignored in the current tables, but should 
be borne in mind.
In the next section we look in more de-
tail at some actual rankings to illustrate our 
points.
Examples: choosing schools
We have analysed data for 2007 GCSE scores 
using the National Pupil database (NPD; see 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/
CMPO/PLUG/whatisplug.htm). Th is is 
a census of all pupils in the English state edu-
cation system. Th e NPD holds data on pupils’ 
test score histories and a limited number of 
 pupil level characteristics. We have matched 
the examination scores to the key stage 2 ex-
ams in 2002. 
Th e caterpillar plot in Figure 1 shows the 
rankings of 54 secondary schools in one local 
authority in 2004. Th e top graph shows the 
mean exam scores—the raw scores—ranked 
from lowest to highest with 95% conﬁ dence 
intervals. Th e bottom graph is similar but is 
based on the value-added school estimates. We 
have also highlighted two schools: in the top 
graph one, indicated by the large blue triangle, 
is signiﬁ cantly below the overall mean and the 
other, indicated by the large green circle, is 
signiﬁ cantly above (they are also signiﬁ cantly 
diﬀ erent from each other). However, their 
value-added estimates in the lower graph place 
them both near the centre of the distribution 
with no evidence that either is signiﬁ cantly dif-
ferent from the mean or from each other.
By publishing both the raw scores and 
value-added ones it is left open to schools to 
choose the data that shows them in the best 
light in their promotional literature. Users 
such as parents should therefore take care 
to discover which set of data is being used. 
Users should also try to obtain appropriate 
conﬁ dence interval estimates, although the 
situation is somewhat problematic since conﬁ -
Figure 1. Rankings of 54 secondary schools from one local authority in 2004
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dence intervals for the raw scores are not made 
available by the DCSF. 
In Figure 2 we analyse 274 secondary 
schools, which have been chosen at random 
from the 2007 data. We plot the rank of the 
contextual value-added scores for these schools 
against the rank of their value-added scores. In 
both cases we adjust for a range of pupil level 
variables including gender, age, free school meal 
status and ethnicity. For the contextual value-
added model we additionally adjust for the 
mean and standard deviation of the prior test 
scores of all the pupils in each pupil’s school. 
In the graph, schools have higher ranks the 
further they are from the origin and schools 
that lie above the 45° line perform better on 
the contextual value-added measure than on 
the value-added measure. Th e graph shows 
that adjusting for pupils’ characteristics alters 
the rankings for many schools. Interestingly, 
it shows that for selective (grammar) schools 
the addition of compositional variables tends 
to lower the relative rankings. Th e selective 
admissions polices of grammar schools ensure 
that their pupils have a high mean and nar-
row spread of intake achievement. Hence, by 
including compositional variables we are also 
adjusting for the initially higher prior achieve-
ments and smaller variability in this group of 
schools. Th is ﬁ nding for grammar schools may 
be quite relevant for accountability purposes, 
when we wish to discount the initial advan-
tages of such schools, but is not relevant for 
school choice.
Finally, Figure 3 is a value-added caterpil-
lar plot using the data on the 54 schools as de-
scribed above, but now displaying the predicted 
estimates 6 years ahead, in 2010, assuming a 
correlation of 0.6 between the estimates for 
2004 and 2010 and the same variance between 
schools in each year. We see clearly that no 
schools can be separated from the average, nor 
are there any pairwise signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences. 
We ﬁ nd a similar result for the larger data set 
of 274 schools where we estimate that under 
5% of schools can be separated from the aver-
age using predictions 6 years ahead, compared 
to just over 60% that can be separated on the 
basis of current estimates alone. 
Conclusions
We have argued that the publication of school 
league tables, as they currently stand, leaves 
much to be desired. It is generally recognised 
that the promotion of raw scores as judgements 
of school quality is not justiﬁ ed. In addition, 
we have argued that the use of value-added 
scores for school choice is severely constrained 
by wide conﬁ dence intervals and the extra un-
certainty introduced when one considers that 
the person making a choice of school is actually 
interested in future predicted values. We have 
shown that taking this extra uncertainty into 
account implies that very few schools indeed 
can be separated from each other or, indeed, 
from the population mean. In addition, the 
present DCSF contextual value-added tables 
are inappropriate for school choice, despite be-
ing promoted as such. Parents relying on league 
tables to select a school for their children are 
using a tool not ﬁ t for that purpose. 
In terms of accountability the inher-
ent imprecision of all estimates reduces their 
usefulness for accountability other than for 
internal “screening” purposes or, when properly 
understood, to assist the judgements of school 
inspectors. 
We have said nothing, since it was not 
our principal purpose, about the side eﬀ ects 
and perverse incentives generated by the use of 
league tables. Th ese are undoubtedly serious. 
Th ere is an incentive, for example, for a 
school to discourage pupils from taking “hard” 
subjects, such as foreign languages and  sciences, 
because they fear depressing the proportion 
achieving passes. Some schools, it is said, con-
centrate excessively on “borderline” pupils, who 
might just scrape the C grade which counts 
towards the school’s score, at the expense of 
those striving for A grades and those who 
might manage a D but not a C. 
Th e interested reader is referred to the 
report of a Royal Statistical Society working 
party for a detailed discussion3. Although 
we have not discussed the use of measures 
of trends over time—so called improvement 
scores produced by the DCSF—the same is-
sues apply to these, especially since these scores 
are generally not based on any kind of value-
added analysis.
Finally, it is noteworthy that Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland have either never 
had or have moved away from publishing 
school league tables. Now seems a good time 
for England to follow suit.
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Figure 2. Contextual versus (non-contextual) value-
added estimates
Figure 3. Ranks of value-added scores predicted 6 years ahead
Now seems a good time to 
abandon school league tables.
